Michael Lewis, the author of Moneyball, wrote an op-ed piece in today’s New York Times. The premise is, basically, that baseball’s current revenue sharing agreement is not working, and that it should be replaced by his merit based system where small market clubs’ income from revenue sharing would be based on attendance.
His article contains many misconceptions and misrepresentations, which will be detailed as follows.
Like the Oakland Athletics, Minnesota Twins, the Detroit Tigers, and the San Diego Padres last year, a small-market team proved competitive enough to reach the playoffs. But revenue sharing, as it is now structured, actually makes lasting success less likely for all five of these teams (Colorado previously mentioned).
First of all, throw Detroit and San Diego out of that equation because they are not small market teams. San Diego has a population of 1.2 million and Detroit has a population of nearly a million.
Lewis bases his premise on the fact that the A’s, the Twins and the Padres failed to make the playoffs this season, meaning they haven’t had lasting success.
Revenue sharing began in 1998. Since 1998, the Athletics have made five playoff appearances and won the AL West four times. The Minnesota Twins have won the AL Central four times.
By any measure, these clubs would be examples of “lasting success” in the revenue sharing era. This mistake would have been excusable, had one started following baseball in 2006. Though, since Lewis’ claim to fame and opportunity to write an op-ed for the New York Times is based on him writing a book discussing the “lasting success” of the Athletics, his comments are downright ludicrous.
Since revenue sharing began, at least one team from each of the big four markets – New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Boston – has appeared in every World Series except 2006.
First of all, someone who is an academic should probably use a more descriptive term than “big” to describe a market.
In terms of population, Boston is the 12th largest among teams that have a Major League baseball team and is less than half the size of “small market” San Diego.
Also, does playing in a large city really correlate with success? The Red Sox had an 86 year drought without a World Series. The White Sox had an 88 year drought. The Cubs will hit the century mark should they lose next season.
Where is Houston’s perennially awesome team?
Do you want a real statistic to determine whether or not there has been parity? Twenty-two out of 30 MLB teams have appeared in the playoffs since 1999.
The problem is that transfers are based on local revenues. Teams that receive money are encouraged to invest it in their payrolls. But if a team actually attracts fans by fielding a winning team, its revenue-sharing receipts will be reduced.
This is the same specious reasoning that argues against welfare and any other type of assistance package for people. We shouldn’t give people welfare money because it makes them lazy and prevents them from getting off their ass and getting a job.
Like with the welfare argument, it is technically correct. A baseball owner could simply just gut his team and collect the revenue sharing checks. But then what is the point of owning a baseball team? Most owners are independently wealthy. Why do they bother owning a team to watch them sink into oblivion?
It also seems like a simple argument, a winning team attracts fans. If a small market team can field a winner, all of their financial problems will be solved.
In reality, things are not quite that simple. The Marlins have won two World Series titles since their inception in 1993. They should have the greatest fans in the world, but they don’t. Their lack of fan support is so egregious it now seems not a question of if but when the Marlins will leave South Florida.
The performance of the team is certainly a factor, but not necessarily the decisive factor in attendance. Demographics may also play a roll. Teams in Florida suffer from their large elderly and out of state populations. People who rooted for the Red Sox and Yankees for 60 years do not all of a sudden become Devil Rays fans when they move to Florida.
Many times, the problems are underlying and structural, making winning not necessarily a panacea.
Linking revenue sharing to attendance would encourage teams to spend more on players. By winning more games, they would benefit from both higher gate receipts and increased revenue-sharing payments.
Here is the heart of the problem with Lewis’ premise. He automatically equates spending more on players to winning more games. His writing here assumes that is the natural result.
The Red Sox have not developed into the dominant force in baseball by spending money on players, but by using money to revamp their scouting and player development. The key to their World Series winning squad was not expensive acquisitions like J.D. Drew and Julio Lugo, but inexpensive farm system products like Ellsbury, Pedroia, Papelbon, and Youkilis.
Similarly, the Rockies were not a fluke with a low payroll having a successful season. They achieved such success because they developed young players over time through their farm system and had patience. When they spent like crazy on guys like Mike Hampton, they were terrible.
Lewis essentially ignores the winds of change in baseball. Spending is important, but clubs have now realized that it is more economical to develop players through superior scouting and the draft. For the Royals, the revamping of their draft philosophy and investment will pay far greater long-term dividends than splashing in the free-agent market and giving Gil Meche an insane contract.
But, why be this hard on Lewis? It’s not like he wrote a whole book on this or anything.
